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DIALOGIC COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 
 
Eduard Jordaan 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Use of the term ‘cosmopolitan/communitarian debate’ to organise philosophical 
disagreements over global justice never really caught on, presumably because it 
exaggerated the contrast between the two sides and was unable to pick up on the nuance  
and qualification in the writing concerned. It is a hard contrast to maintain when 
communitarian authors argue that obligations of justice extend beyond national borders 
and cosmopolitans accept the value of local cultures and of special affective and political 
relationships (Tan, 2004; Miller, 2007). Nevertheless, the moral priorities of participants 
in debates about global justice are generally clear enough for us to say that a national-
global dichotomy remains the most prominent line that mark their disagreements. Those 
on the cosmopolitan side of the debate hold the advantage of promising a quicker route to 
global justice, whereas those who see justice as largely a national matter enjoy the 
advantage of being closer to the way things presently work. Given their greater distance 
from the current reality, the onus has been on cosmopolitans to defend the tenet that all 
human beings are deserving of equal moral concern in the face of the fact that we tend to 
be more concerned for members of our personal circle, our community and our nation. 
Cosmopolitans further have had to contend with arguments that justice is an expression 
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of the choices, values and institutions of a specific political community and that a 
political community in this sense cannot exist at the global level; that the aspirations of 
cosmopolitans are not as universal as they think, given an intellectual ancestry that lies 
with Western thinkers such as the Stoics, Marcus Aurelius and Immanuel Kant; that 
cosmopolitanism does not take differences between people seriously enough; that it 
overestimates the individual’s ability to cast off his or her socio-cultural baggage; and 
that it tends to universalise the views of a lone (white, male, Western) interpreter. 
 
Categorising these objections is difficult; suffice to say that a national-global fault line 
remains prominent. One approach that seems able to reduce the alleged national-global 
contrast and therefore promises to advance the debate is ‘dialogic cosmopolitanism’. 
Dialogic cosmopolitans aim to bridge the alleged national-global divide by starting from 
premises that come close to being ‘communitarian’ – I continue to use the term for want 
of a better one – and from there working to a cosmopolitan position. Dialogic 
cosmopolitans try to lay the foundation from which to theorise just global arrangements – 
they do not offer a substantive vision of global justice – with the added burden of having 
accepted much of the criticism that has been levelled against cosmopolitanism from the 
communitarian side. Following a ‘communitarian path to cosmopolitanism’ (Shapcott, 
2001:31) involves viewing the current boundaries of our moral concern as serious 
obstacles, while stressing that moral loyalties can be reshaped and expanded in ways that 
do not necessarily coincide with the boundaries of political community; treating the 
values and cultures of other societies with greater respect, while simultaneously insisting 
on a commitment to dialogue across cultural frontiers; steering clear of a monologically 
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asserted view of what is just and instead seeing justice as what derives from open 
discussion among differently situated persons; and recognising that our views of justice 
and of who deserves our moral concern are shaped by our socio-political environment, 
but insisting that views can be reshaped.  
 
Leaving aside the tricky matter of how to organise the various streams of cosmopolitan 
thought (see Pogge, 2002:168-177; Tan, 2004:40-61; Caney, 2005:102-147), the 
cosmopolitan writings of Andrew Linklater, Richard Shapcott and Fred Dallmayr have 
enough in common to be grouped together, have enough in common with 
cosmopolitanism to remain within its fold, yet are distinct enough from other 
cosmopolitan texts to be regarded as a separate approach, namely dialogic 
cosmopolitanism. My principal aim is to critically present the central elements of the 
dialogic cosmopolitan approach to justice for these elements are intended to absorb some 
of the criticism that has been levelled against cosmopolitanism as well as to reflect some 
recent developments in political philosophy. Dialogic cosmopolitanism contains four 
central elements: a respect for difference; a commitment to dialogue; an open, hesitant 
and self-problematising attitude on the part of the individual; and an undertaking to 
expand the boundaries of moral concern to the point of universal inclusion.1 To be sure, 
some of these elements are detectable in other cosmopolitan texts, but only in dialogic 
cosmopolitanism do all four elements feature prominently. It will be concluded that 
despite the inclusion of many welcome elements, dialogic cosmopolitanism is weighed 
down by problems of inclusion and a lack of attention to matters of distributive justice. 
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The rest of this article will discuss the four elements that characterise dialogic 
cosmopolitanism and indicate points of agreement and disagreement within this 
cosmopolitan approach. Disagreements among dialogic cosmopolitans stem primarily 
from Linklater’s reliance on Habermas’s discourse ethics, as opposed to Shapcott and 
Dallmayr’s reliance on Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.2 Discussion of Habermas 
and Gadamer’s own writings will be drawn upon only in so far as these illuminate the 
arguments of dialogic cosmopolitans. Significantly, Habermas’s own theoretical writings 
on international affairs will not be considered as these tend to focus on matters of 
legitimacy, the impact of globalisation on democratic states, international law, and the 
creation of a public to match the economic and political integration that has occurred in 
Europe (Habermas, 1998, 2001, 2006a, 2006b). Habermas’s contributions in this regard 
are significant and has been a topic of discussion in International Relation literature (Fine 
and Smith, 2003; Anievas, 2005; Diez and Steans, 2005; Haacke, 2005), but his writings 
say little about justice to difference and the role of dialogue in situations of value 
pluralism, two matters on which he has written influentially in his national-level political 
theory and which are of central importance to dialogic cosmopolitans. 
 
The ‘dialogic cosmopolitanism’ of Dallmayr, Linklater and Shapcott has received 
individual attention in the literature (Elshtain, 1999; Geras, 1999; Walker, 1999; Reus-
Smit, 2000; Connolly, 2001; Rengger, 2001; Schneck, 2006), but dialogic 
cosmopolitanism on the whole has received little more than passing mention. A partial 
exception has been some of Andrew Dobson’s writing in which he divides 
cosmopolitanism into distributive and dialogic camps and raises a number of objections 
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against dialogic cosmopolitanism (Dobson, 2003, 2005, 2006). Dobson (2006:168) 
admits that his distinction between the two forms of cosmopolitanism is a ‘brutal’ one. 
Significant for my purposes, the components that make up the dialogic form of 
cosmopolitanism remain unspecified, apart from the obvious centrality of dialogue. Some 
of the problems Dobson identifies with dialogic cosmopolitanism will be addressed 
below. 
 
 
FOUR ELEMENTS OF DIALOGIC COSMOPOLITANISM 
 
 
A Commitment to Dialogue 
 
 
For dialogic cosmopolitans, deep cultural differences do not present a fundamental 
obstacle to our engagement of others as equal conversational partners. Equality as 
conversational partners manifests itself in genuine dialogue, that is, in which there is no 
presumption about the outcome of the conversation and about who might learn from 
whom (Dallmayr, 1996:97; Linklater, 1998:85). The commitment of dialogic 
cosmopolitans to engage the other as an equal conversational partner stems from at least 
three sources: the influence of the view that disagreements on what is just cannot be 
settled through access to an impartial, free-standing point of view; ambivalence about the 
moral authority of the West; and respect for difference.  
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By holding the view that justice stems from the choices, cultures and circumstances of 
specific groups, dialogic cosmopolitans come closer to the communitarian side than to 
the abstraction and ahistoricism characteristic of cosmopolitanism. A view of justice as 
deeply reflective of a specific socio-historical context has gained increasing currency in 
recent years, especially after Rawls (1985) clarified his conception of justice as ‘political, 
not metaphysical’. However, where dialogic cosmopolitans part ways with 
communitarians is in their willingness to consider not only the voices of those within the 
boundaries of one’s political community, but to also enter into dialogue about justice with 
those beyond its borders. In other words, for dialogic cosmopolitans, the boundaries of 
moral community extend beyond those of political community. Indeed, the socially 
constructed character of moral truth and justice means that there is no intrinsic reason 
why these cannot be reshaped to include the views of outsiders, a process that would be 
helped along by a widening of political boundaries. Moreover, Linklater, in particular, 
frequently points to the moral resources in modern societies that hold the potential to be 
harnessed for transformative purposes. These include the Kantian belief that extending 
legal rights to members of other societies is inherent to liberal societies and a conception 
of citizenship that includes ‘support for collective action to improve the conditions of the 
unfairly excluded’ (Linklater, 1998:4; 2007:75). 
 
Dialogic cosmopolitans are very careful not to proclaim the moral superiority of the West, 
given the West’s history of presumed cultural and racial superiority, even though 
occasional claims that Europe is an example of how to live alongside ‘otherness in a 
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narrow space’ (Dallmayr, 1998:53) and that the ‘modern West represents a major 
advance in the development of moral-practical rationality’ might count as such (Linklater, 
1998:121). Dialogic cosmopolitans further recognise that despite the growing influence 
of non-Western societies, the West by and large continues to shape global moral 
discourse and to dominate the most significant international institutions (Dallmayr, 
1996:ix). Weary of the dark side of Western civilisation, dialogic cosmopolitans stress 
the ‘non-domineering’ potential in the cultural and political practices of the West 
(Dallmayr, 1998:xix). The expanded use of open dialogue – which is characteristic of 
Western societies – when interacting with outsiders is one important way to counteract 
Western prescriptiveness. 
 
Cosmopolitan theory has frequently discarded human difference in an attempt to distil 
what all people have in common so as to derive principles of justice that would hold 
across time and place. However, if one respects the difference of the other, then one 
cannot presume to speak on her behalf or know what is in her interest. In fact, the other’s 
interests can only be revealed through questioning, which means that recognition of the 
other and her difference is a dialogic task (Dallmayr, 1998:7). Moreover, just agreement 
or compromise among different persons can only be achieved through dialogue, for one 
does not know in advance what would be agreed to (Shapcott, 2001:39). Viewed from 
another perspective, a commitment to dialogue is intended to prevent the suppression or 
neglect of marginal voices (Linklater, 1998:41).  
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Despite concurring on the centrality of dialogue, there is some disagreement among 
dialogic cosmopolitans over its purpose. For Linklater, strongly influenced by 
Habermas’s discourse ethics, the goal of dialogue is to achieve universal consensus. 
Linklater’s is a universalism that emphasises the primacy of answerability to other people; 
‘norms cannot be regarded as valid unless they have, or could command, the consent of 
all those who stand to be affected by them’ (Linklater, 1998:96). Only through dialogue 
with people from other cultures can we can figure out which norms have mere parochial 
acclaim and which have wider validity (Linklater, 1998:79). Moral progress entails a 
movement away from parochial forms of life towards a commitment to using discourse as 
means of investigating ‘the possibility of an agreement about the principles of 
coexistence’ (Linklater, 1998:96).  
 
Shapcott and Dallmayr are very concerned about the limited view of conversation 
apparent in discourse ethics. According to them, Habermas, and Linklater, by implication, 
regard conversation simply as a means to resolve moral disputes (Shapcott, 2001:128). 
Against its own commitment to respect the situatedness of persons, Habermasian 
discourse becomes ‘a quasi-transcendental platform predicated on idealised conditions of 
speech’ in which participants need to have momentarily suspended their ‘ordinary 
actions’ in order to participate (Dallmayr, 1998:257). The Habermasian emphasis on 
rational discourse sidelines other types of speech (for example, narration), whereas the 
emphasis on universalisation unnecessarily limits the topics of conversation by excluding 
from dialogue problems that might be understood as moral in everyday terms, but that 
might not aspire to universal validity (Dallmayr, 2001:343). Certainly, what ought to be 
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done in a heavily contextual setting can be subjected to reasoned discussion, even though 
the accepted solution might not have universal validity. The Habermasian emphasis on 
consensus thus leads to conceptions of reason, moral action and dialogue that are too 
restrictive (Shapcott, 2001:112-13). 
 
A dialogic approach based on Gadamer’s writing does not discount the possibility of 
agreement, but is most committed to conversation aimed at the less demanding goal of 
‘understanding’ (Shapcott, 2001:147). To explain: Our perspective on the world is 
dominated by the influence of ‘what is nearest to us’ (Gadamer, 2004:304). We acquire a 
‘horizon’ when we look beyond what is near and familiar, ‘not in order to look away 
from it, but to see it better, within a larger whole and in a truer proportion’ (Gadamer, 
2004:304). However, the term ‘horizon’ suggests that our view from a particular point 
remains limited (Gadamer, 2004:301). Conversation with others (as well as an 
engagement with texts) helps us to see beyond our own horizon and further helps to make 
the ideas of another person intelligible, without us necessarily agreeing with his point of 
view (Gadamer, 2004:301; Shapcott, 2001:143, 171). Understanding, ‘a fusion of 
horizons’, is the result of dialogue and entails the sharing of a new and expanded 
perspective that neither conversational partner could have achieved alone (Gadamer, 
2004:305; Shapcott, 2001:131).3 The Gadamerian emphasis on dialogue is particularly 
relevant for addressing moral uncertainty. For Gadamer (2004:311), ‘the task of moral 
knowledge is to figure out what is required in a concrete situation in light of what is 
required of one in general’. Gadamer distinguishes between technical and moral 
knowledge. While the concern of both is application to specific situations, technical 
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knowledge is particular and focused on specific ends, whereas moral action asks about 
and orients itself to the good in general (Gadamer, 2007:231, 311-313). Much of what is 
regarded as good is handed-down tradition, yet no tradition is truly closed and hence we 
can break off and reformulate parts of it through dialogue to form a new horizon 
(Gadamer, 2004:282, 303). Indeed, one is spurred into dialogue and an effort to 
understand ‘when one comes up against something that is strange, challenging, 
disorienting’ (Gadamer, 2007:92).  
 
While few would object to the general desirability of dialogue across social boundaries, 
Dobson argues that dialogic cosmopolitanism’s constant insistence on the use of dialogue 
to understand the other or to find out what she needs is misguided for it is often plainly 
obvious what the other needs. As a case in point, Dobson mentions the submergence of 
two islands that used to be part of the Pacific island nation of Kiribati as a result of global 
warming. ‘The Small Island States do not want to talk any more. What they want is for 
net contributors to global warming to reduce their impact on the global environment’ 
(Dobson, 2003:23-24). Yes, it is obvious that we should reduce carbon emissions to 
protect the people of Kiribati and others. However, the point that dialogic cosmopolitans 
would make is that for states at different levels of economic development to achieve a 
fair solution to the problem of global warming a reliance on dialogue would be 
unavoidable. Another example of an obvious problem with a not-so-obvious solution is 
global poverty; its intractability is nicely captured by the title of a book by William 
Easterly (2001), The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and 
Misadventures in the Tropics. There is plenty of evidence that development projects have 
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failed as a result of not including the intended beneficiaries in the planning and decision-
making process, an arrogance dialogic cosmopolitans seek to avoid. Whereas Dobson 
accuses dialogic cosmopolitans of a preoccupation with engaging victims in dialogue 
when the material injustices they have suffered are obvious, I think it is more accurate to 
say that dialogic cosmopolitans tend to overlook matters of material/distributive injustice 
on the whole in favour of a focus on doing ‘justice to difference’, a matter that will be 
discussed further in the next section. In defence of dialogic cosmopolitanism, it should be 
said that a commitment to doing justice to difference is more dependent on dialogue than 
distributive justice, as the former type of injustice is often subtle and its perpetrators 
sometimes well-intentioned and unaware of the harm they have caused. 
 
 
Respect for Difference 
 
 
The commitment of dialogic cosmopolitans to doing justice to difference reflects recent 
developments in social theory. In addition to the writings of Habermas and Gadamer, Iris 
Young and Charles Taylor’s arguments about the significance of not giving due respect 
to forms of life that differ from ours have also had considerable impact on dialogic 
cosmopolitans (Young, 1990; Taylor, 1994).4 For Taylor (1994:25),  
 
our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer 
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real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror 
back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of 
themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a 
form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced 
mode of being.  
 
Young’s writing is additionally important for its criticism of a preoccupation with 
distribution when thinking about justice, given that injustice often has no apparent 
distributive dimension, a shift in focus that Shapcott (2001:10) firmly endorses. At a 
minimum, justice to difference requires treating people with identities different to ours 
with equal respect and enabling them to maintain and express as much of their 
heterogeneity in the face of necessary homogenising pressures.  
 
Dialogic cosmopolitanism’s concern with justice to difference stems not only from recent 
theoretical developments, but is also a response to our globalised era in which there is 
much more contact with people and cultures that are different, an interdependence that 
has been marked by the growing influence of non-Western societies (Dallmayr, 1996:ix). 
Linklater (1998:32) further argues that globalisation has encouraged the politics of 
identity as communities have tried to resist the homogenising pressures of globalisation, 
although it need not be suppressive of difference. Instead, the global political order can 
and should be transformed towards one in which there are ‘significant advances in 
universality’ and increased respect for cultural differences (Linklater, 1998:3). Dialogue 
is a mechanism through which to achieve universality and to protect those who are 
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regarded as different from marginalisation or oppression (Linklater, 1998:41; 2007:55). 
Moreover, dialogically derived solutions to problems of coexistence would reduce the 
tension between the two seemingly opposite goals of universality and difference. Note 
that Shapcott, compared to Linklater, sees a stronger tension between universality and 
difference and prefers to stand closer to the difference side of this tension and to settle for 
‘understanding’, rather than the more demanding goal of (universal) consensus.  
 
Although we are told that ‘the politics of recognition is far from unconcerned with the 
redistribution of wealth’ (Linklater, 1998:187), it is not clear (or even addressed) how 
distributive issues are to be dealt with dialogically. To be sure, dialogic cosmopolitans 
make reference to the need for greater material equality and some have even written 
longer pieces on this matter (Dallmayr, 2006). For the most part, however, dialogic 
cosmopolitans deal with issues pertaining to justice of recognition and those pertaining to 
distributive justice as unrelated, not the muddle Fraser, Honneth, and others have been 
trying to untangle (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). One sees evidence of such a 
dichotomisation in Shapcott’s book in which he defends a focus on recognition by 
arguing that ‘in many societies today the concern with class discrimination has been 
replaced by or overshadowed by debates on how to recognise the place of various 
cultures or groups’ and in which he cites Australia, Canada and the United States as 
examples of places where such a shift has occurred (Shapcott, 2001:11). If recognition is 
to be the focal point at the expense of distribution, it is surprising that one finds no 
reference to the argument that distributional injustices must be understood in terms of 
recognition, or the lack thereof, as Honneth has argued (Honneth and Fraser, 2003:114).  
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When dialogic cosmopolitans do bring issues of distribution and recognition into contact, 
it amounts to little more than assertions of a ‘duty to create the social and economic 
conditions which will ensure that participation within appropriate frameworks is 
meaningful for the largest possible number of the world’s population’ (Linklater, 
1998:205-06). Problematically, Linklater here seems to rely on a type of monological 
cosmopolitanism that dialogic cosmopolitans have criticised for its levelling of difference 
and the particularity of situations (Dallmayr, 1998:254; Linklater, 1998:48; 2007:51; 
Shapcott, 2001:36-42). Ironically, and despite their commitment to difference, in dialogic 
cosmopolitanism one finds no engagement with Walzer’s (1983) argument that 
distributive arrangements and the goods that are up for redistribution themselves are 
deeply reflective of time and place and should be understood as such. More importantly, 
by leaving matters of distribution so far to the side, dialogic cosmopolitans burden their 
approach with questionable priorities. The deadly urgency of global poverty,5 firstly, 
cannot wait for the construction of a dialogic community of global scope; secondly, 
seems mostly to be a problem of distribution rather than recognition; and thirdly, far 
exceeds the number of deaths in which matters of identity play a greater role (for 
example, civil war or ethnic violence) (Pogge, 2001:8-9). The marginal place of 
distributive justice in dialogic cosmopolitanism restricts the usefulness of this approach 
to thinking about global justice. While fixable, this problem is compounded by the 
argument that will be made in the final section, namely that certain premises in dialogic 
cosmopolitanism are likely to hamper the entry of the world’s poor into a larger moral 
community characterised by open dialogue. 
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The Uncertain Self 
 
 
Dialogic cosmopolitanism shares with communitarians a conception of the self as a 
situated being, a person whose values and scope of moral concern have been shaped by 
history, social context and political boundaries. But, whereas communitarian writers are 
committed to preserving the context and the boundaries in which an individual’s moral 
outlook was formed, dialogic cosmopolitans aim to include outsiders in a genuine 
conversation about matters that affect them. Dialogic cosmopolitans write as if the 
expansion of a dialogic community will always involve the West, typically at the centre 
of this expanding moral universe. Nevertheless, dialogic cosmopolitans are sensitive to 
the Western legacy of colonialism, racism, and so on, and therefore imbue their 
conception of the conversing self with a certain reticence, someone careful not to impose, 
prescribe or dominate. Such reticence is important if the goal is genuine conversation 
with others, for the ‘conceit of superiority, the complacent assumption of holding the key 
to justice and ethical truth, obstructs (or may obstruct) learning on the part of Western 
culture’ (Dallmayr, 1998:268). Put differently, the moral self dialogic cosmopolitans 
have in mind is decentred, exhibits good will towards the excluded, and is willing to open 
his moral beliefs to questioning and to reconfigure these in light of criticism. However, 
disagreements among dialogic cosmopolitans about the status of agreements reached 
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through dialogue seem to translate into theoretically different levels of willingness of the 
self to open its moral beliefs and priorities up for questioning. 
 
Drawing on Habermas, Linklater locates our willingness to question the consequences of 
our actions on outsiders in the post-conventional capacity of moral selves to recognise 
moral norms as parochial. Whereas pre-conventional moral agents obey norms out of fear 
of sanction and conventional moral agents act in conformity with the norms of their 
social group, post-conventional moral agents ‘stand back from authority structures and 
group membership to ask whether they are complying with principles that have universal 
applicability’ (Linklater, 2007:50). At the post-conventional stage, traditional norms lose 
their authority upon being recognised as parochial (Habermas, 1990:162, 178). The 
detachment of norms from the implicit stock of cultural assumptions that lubricate our 
social interaction moves in tandem with the increased rational organisation of society, 
which is necessary for societies to grow and become more complex (Habermas, 
1987:173). While the rationalisation of society has mostly been associated with purposive 
action in which actors pursue success through means-end calculations, it also enables 
communicative action whereby actors are less concerned with their egocentric success 
but rather pursue and orient their individual goals on the basis of an articulated 
understanding with others (Habermas, 1984:285-86). Yet Habermas is interested in more 
than mere intersubjective agreement; for him it is also important to determine the 
worthiness of a norm to be recognised (Habermas, 1990:61). The standard against which 
to judge the worthiness of a norm is its universality, which stems from the (real or 
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potential) approval granted by ‘all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical 
discourse’ (Habermas, 1990:66). 
 
Gadamer locates moral self-questioning and openness to the ideas of others in the 
‘experienced’ person, someone who has had her generalisations ‘continually refuted by 
experience’ and who has become ‘radically undogmatic’ as a result (Gadamer, 2004:347-
50). What is ‘experienced’ is ‘human finitude’, the recognition of one’s fallibility and 
ignorance (Shapcott, 2001:151-152). Our ignorance is partly the result of the horizons 
that surround us as situated beings. It is an awareness of our historicity that gives rise to 
the desire to know and therefore to engage others in conversation – a person trying to 
understand is prepared to be told something (Gadamer, 2004:354, 271). Although no 
horizon is truly closed, it is nevertheless difficult to become aware of the parochial nature 
of our views and values, since being situated means not being able to move to a point 
from where to obtain an objective and total perspective on our situation (Gadamer, 
2004:301-03). Unlike Habermas, Gadamer has little to say about the social factors that 
make the questioning of our own truth claims and entry into dialogue with others more 
likely (Shapcott, 2001:187). At most, Gadamer considers such self-questioning to be 
most likely in gebildete (cultured) societies, that is, societies in which people have 
acquired norms that are more defensible to outsiders as well as the ability to acquire such 
norms (Warnke, 1987:174). 
 
According to Shapcott, the barriers to entry into conversation with the other are much 
lower on the Gadamerian account. This benefit of the Gadamerian approach stems from 
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its view of conversation, which does not necessarily require giving up one’s own beliefs 
but merely gaining insight into the other’s point of view. However, when agreement 
becomes necessary – and Gadamer is ambigious on consensus as a goal for conversation 
(Warnke 1987:169) – then it would seem as though entry into conversation is at least as 
demanding, if not more, for the Gadamerian ‘experienced’ self as compared to the 
Habermasian post-conventional self. For the post-conventional self, the burden of moral 
self-questioning is made lighter by the assurance that she has reached the highest stage of 
moral development and that her parochial moral views will be replaced by ones based on 
a wider consensus. By contrast, claims that Gadamer’s ‘experienced’ person represents a 
moral advance are much more muted. More significantly, Gadamerian writers do not 
claim for consensual arrangements the firmness and solace of universality, firstly, 
because such agreements remain tied to and reflective of historical conditions, and 
secondly, because another understanding is always possible as ‘any understanding 
necessarily ignores certain features of a text, culture or situation of action in its very 
focus on and clarification of others’ (Warnke 1987:130). The lesser promise that awaits 
the self-questioning ‘experienced’ self suggests that the Gadamerian subject’s leap into 
self-questioning and conversation with the other requires greater courage when compared 
with the assurance of progress and relative certainty offered to the post-conventional self, 
hence the frequent association of dialogue with risk by Gadamer and his interpreters. In 
the words of Dallmayr, entering into dialogue with the other ‘requires a willingness to 
“risk oneself”, that is, to plunge headlong into a transformative learning process in which 
the status of the self and other are continuously renegotiated’ (Dallmayr, 1996:xviii).  
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Expanding and Deepening Community 
 
 
Dialogic cosmopolitans have much sympathy with the communitarian insistence on the 
meaningfulness and perpetuation of communal life. However, as with all forms of 
cosmopolitanism, dialogic cosmopolitans fear that communitarians attach ‘more moral 
significance than is justified to the differences between fellow-nationals and aliens’ 
(Linklater, 1998:3). Excessive loyalty to fellow citizens creates the danger that we 
‘acquire indifference to, and may become enemies of, the rest of the human race’ 
(Linklater, 1998:25). To counteract this danger, dialogic cosmopolitans stress the need 
for engaging outsiders in dialogue. Moreover, dialogic cosmopolitanism parts ways with 
a more communitarian approach by seeking to expand the boundaries of moral 
community to a universal level, leaving no social boundary ‘automatically beyond 
question and reproach’ (Linklater, 1998:100). One could question whether thinking of 
moral concern for outsiders in terms of community – as opposed to, say, ‘network 
pluralism’ (Connolly, 2001) or a multiplicity of non-territorial affiliations and 
overlapping identities (Erskine, 2002) – is the right approach. Be that as it may, the 
aspiration of dialogic cosmopolitans to global communality is smoothed by the light 
definition of community as ‘the act of inclusion in the moral world’ (Shapcott, 2001:3).6 
Dialogic cosmopolitans recognise that to translate the universalistic trajectory of moral 
concern into justice would require, firstly, capable supranational political institutions, and 
second, a bond stronger than mere moral regard. 
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Dialogic cosmopolitanism requires supranational institutions to open channels of 
transnational discourse and to turn universal normative agreements into policies with 
tangible consequences. Shapcott (2001:213) follows theorists of global deliberative 
democracy in seeing international institutions, international non-governmental 
organisations and states as sites for increased communicative contestation. Linklater 
(1998;167), in turn, argues for the ideal of a post-Westphalian order that no longer 
presupposes ‘the commitment to sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship 
which differentiates the modern form of political community from all previous forms of 
political organisation’. Instead of tying citizenship to the state, loyalties and governance 
are to be exercised at different levels, specifically, the province, the state, the region and 
the world (Linklater, 1998:198). Pluralist and solidarist arrangements of international 
society are capable of doing justice to the concerns of outsiders, but a Westphalian 
international society would strengthen this likelihood through the additional 
‘commitment to widen the boundaries of the political community so that insiders and 
outsiders can be associated as equal members of a transnational citizenry’ (Linklater, 
1998:175). While Europe certainly is a good example of a transition to a post-
Westphalian arrangement, it remains hard to imagine, and Linklater offers little clarity, 
how the European ‘experiment in close political cooperation’ could be globalised.  
 
Authors with a communitarian bent have long argued that justice – fair solutions to 
problems that stem from human interaction – requires a significant amount of we-feeling 
among those who participate in a scheme of justice. Although dialogic cosmopolitans are 
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very uncomfortable with the communitarian tendency to confine justice to the national 
level, they share the communitarian view that solidarity is necessary among people to 
whom justice is to apply. In Shapcott’s terms, ‘[b]ecause philosophical hermeneutics is 
universalistic in its claims this means that it is concerned ultimately with the creation of 
universal solidarity as the necessary condition for the exercise of practical reasoning on a 
global scale’ (Shapcott, 2001:159). So, to turn transnational moral conversations into 
justice and to address the motivational deficit that has plagued cosmopolitanism, dialogic 
cosmopolitans identify actual and potential sources of transnational solidarity. Many of 
these sources have no obvious connection to the communicative aspects of their 
cosmopolitanism. According to Shapcott, solidarity could be based on as little as ‘the 
acknowledgement of a shared historical predicament, situation or of a common future’ 
(Shapcott, 2001:159), whereas Linklater cites the emotional identification with the 
suffering of outsiders as a potential source of solidarity with them (Linklater, 2007:182-
88). Linklater (1998:105; 2007, pp. 129-190) also mentions concerns over causing 
transnational harm as an impetus for expanded solidarity, an approach Dobson (2005) 
recommends over attempts to base moral progress on trying to expand empathy for 
outsiders. What is somewhat surprising about Linklater’s discussion of solidarity is the 
absence of any mention of Habermas’s arguments about the integrative effects of 
communication. Habermas points out that communicative action enables the deepening 
and expansion of solidarity by giving participants the opportunity to develop and affirm 
their shared identities (Habermas 1987:139). By contrast, Shapcott does mention the 
importance of creating solidarity through conversation (Shapcott, 2001:128, 176). 
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Unfortunately, the precise mechanisms through which dialogue is to be turned into 
solidarity – that is, more than ‘understanding’ – remain unspecified. 
 
This brings us to a major problem with dialogic cosmopolitanism. Despite the aspiration 
to an expanded solidarity, both forms of dialogic cosmopolitanism are hamstrung at an 
earlier point. For Linklater (2007:50), the moral orientation that motivates the aspiration 
to a more inclusive moral community requires the post-conventional ability to ask 
whether the consequences of our actions would be dialogically agreed to by all who stand 
to be affected. A problem appears in Linklater’s ability to include everyone in dialogue, 
for, as the term suggests, a post-conventional morality ‘reflects a particular stage in moral 
development’ (Linklater, 2007:51).7 According to Shapcott (2001:98), this means that a 
‘truly moral relationship between modern and pre-modern agents appears impossible 
because those outside of the discourse of modernity are seen, like children, as not mature 
enough for reasoned discussion’. Thus, despite its aspiration to universal inclusion, 
Linklater’s discourse ethics in effect restricts the types of agents who can practically 
participate in the conversation (Shapcott, 2001:98).  
 
As we have seen, Shapcott is very critical of the restrictions discourse ethics places on 
who may participate in moral dialogue and proposes a ‘radically inclusive’ approach in 
its place. However, it would appear that the barriers to participation in the Gadamerian 
dialogic community are not as low as Shapcott seems to think. For Gadamer, 
participation in dialogue requires the ability of language, an attitude of ‘good will’ on the 
part of participants and the motivation to find the ‘truth’. An attitude of openness to the 
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truth derives from an admission of one’s ‘finitude’, one’s ‘not-knowing’, the questioning 
of one’s truth claims (Dallmayr, 1996:44; Shapcott, 2001:151-52, 169). 8  The 
exclusionary aspect of the Gadamerian approach comes to the fore if we note that not all 
persons and groups are equally willing or likely to question their own truth claims. Not 
counting fundamentalists (who wilfully refuse to question their truth claims), awareness 
of one’s finitude is by definition least likely to occur in the world’s more traditional 
societies (Giddens, 1990:36-45).  
 
The Habermasian and Gadamerian approaches therefore both exclude from dialogue 
those persons who have not acquired a sufficient level of reflexivity, an inability 
disproportionately found among the world’s most traditional or least modernised societies. 
However, and this is the key point, the world’s most traditional societies also tend to be 
the world’s poorest. It goes without saying that a ‘cosmopolitan’ approach that includes 
criteria that leave many of the world’s poorest outside its moral ambit is of very limited 
use.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Dialogic cosmopolitanism shares with other forms of cosmopolitanism an aspiration to 
increasingly move issues of justice to a global level. Dialogic cosmopolitans, however, 
remain weary of decontextualised and unilateralist articulations of justice, disregard of 
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cultural difference, and the motivational deficit that plagues most other forms of 
cosmopolitanism. Dialogic cosmopolitanism shares with the communitarian critics of 
cosmopolitanism the view that who we regard as worthy of moral concern and the depth 
of such concern are deeply shaped by historical and social circumstance, that some ‘we-
feeling’ is necessary for justice to be possible, and that people’s differences from others 
are crucial to their self-understanding. However, dialogic cosmopolitans worry that these 
views tend to translate into a disregard of those outside one’s national political 
community. By navigating through these points of agreement and disagreement with 
cosmopolitan and communitarian texts, dialogic cosmopolitanism seeks to construct a 
basis from which to derive the more substantive content of justice. The four components 
discussed in this article – a commitment to dialogue, respect for difference, a self-
problematising subject, and a commitment to expand the boundaries of moral concern to 
the point of universal inclusion – were presented, when combined, as distinctive of the 
dialogic approach to cosmopolitanism, but more importantly, as central to navigating 
many of the pitfalls on various sides of the debate about global justice.  
 
However, it was also argued that large swathes of the world’s poorest would be among 
the last to be included in the universal moral community that dialogic cosmopolitans seek 
to construct, a problem that is amplified by dialogic cosmopolitanism’s relative disregard 
for matters of distributive justice. A way out for dialogic cosmopolitanism might reside in 
jettisoning all prerequisites for participating in cross-border conversation (such as an 
awareness of one’s finitude), although this would put those who enter such dialogue in 
good faith in a more vulnerable position. Thus far, dialogic cosmopolitans have shown 
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themselves to be cagey about ‘placing the other at a height’ (Shapcott, 2001:104-05; also 
Dallmayr, 1998:139). However, demanding less of our potential conversational partners, 
especially insofar as they constitute the very poor, reflects the impulses of self-denial and 
generosity that animate cosmopolitanism, albeit impulses that cosmopolitan theorisation 
tends to suppress.  
 
This article skirted various problems and questions that might be addressed in future 
research, such as the following: To what extent are dialogic cosmopolitans able to 
address matters of cross-border distributive justice while at the same time remaining 
committed to a respect difference and cultural specificity? What are concrete and detailed 
examples of the poor from beyond our national borders being included in our moral 
community (and remaining in it)? It also seems as though cosmopolitans are very eager to 
dodge accusations of selflessness and sacrifice, despite it being an approach that holds 
very demanding implications. Perhaps it is time for a study that compares the levels of 
sacrifice required by various versions of cosmopolitanism. Finally, in light the above 
argument that dialogic cosmopolitanism has difficulty including large proportions of the 
world’s poorest while at the same time requiring some level of solidarity and interaction, 
there seems to be a need to map global patterns of moral concern. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
 
1  While the cosmopolitan writings of David Held (1995) and Paul Healy (2000, 2006) profess a 
commitment to dialogue, the four elements that characterise dialogic cosmopolitanism are not readily 
visible in their writing.  
2 Dallmayr (2001) has, to a very limited extent, sought to supplement his broadly Gadamerian approach 
with the idea of friendship found in  Oakeshott’s view of conversation. 
3 Dallmayr (1996:41), who relies more heavily on Gadamer’s later writings, has expressed the concern that 
an emphasis on the fusion of horizons implies an end to dialogue, an assimilation of the other, as well as an 
overestimation of the ease with which harmony with others can be achieved. 
4 Considering that ‘recognition’ is so important for dialogic cosmopolitans, it is surprising that they make 
hardly any reference to Axel Honneth’s influential writings on the politics of recognition (Honneth, 1995, 
Fraser and Honneth, 2003). 
5 Ten million people die every year from hunger and hunger-related diseases, according to the World Food 
Programme (2009) 
6 Such a definition leaves aside other possible requirements for inclusion in a community, such as mutual 
recognition, shared culture, or citizenship. Shapcott’s definition also means that my dog is a member of my 
community I are members of the same community, as he is included in my moral world.  
7  Elswhere, Linklater (2007:36) is explicit in identifying the willingness to subject oneself to 
universalisable norms and to expand the scope of who counts as a moral person as two characteristics of 
‘the more advanced moral codes’. 
8 It is therefore contradictory for Shapcott to claim that philosophical hermeneutics ‘does not necessarily 
involve a praxis oriented towards the expansion of the realm of individuals who share the consciousness of 
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finitude or effective historical consciousness. Practical reasoning does not require a community of 
hermeneuts in order to function’ (Shapcott 2001:176). 
